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Corporate Culpable Homicide:
Transco plc v H M Advocate
On 22 December 1999, an explosion in Larkhall resulted in the deaths of a family of four, the
house which they occupied being completely destroyed by the blast. Following investigation by
the police and Health and Safety Executive, Transco plc, a corporate body responsible for gas
distribution, was charged with culpable homicide and, in the alternative, a contravention of
sections 3 and 33(1) of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.
Transco objected to the competency and relevancy of the culpable homicide charge, but
these objections were rejected at a preliminary diet. On appeal, however, it was held that the
charge was irrelevant.1 This decision – Transco plc v H M Advocate2 – is significant as one of only
a very small number of reported decisions which address the criminal liability of corporations
under Scots law, and the only such decision to consider the potential liability of a corporation for
culpable homicide. The court’s decision also rests on certain assumptions about the nature of
criminal responsibility under Scots law which deserve further scrutiny. This note seeks to
highlight these issues and the possibilities for future development of the law.
A. SYMBOLISM AND DENUNCIATION
As noted above, the indictment served on Transco included two alternative charges – one of
culpable homicide and the second of a contravention of sections 3 and 33(1) of the Health and
Safety at Work Act 1974.3 In the case of both offences (as a corporate body cannot, for obvious
reasons, be sentenced to imprisonment), the maximum penalty on conviction would be an
unlimited fine.
That does, therefore, raise the question of why Crown Office should have been concerned to
bring a culpable homicide charge, and equally why Transco should have been moved to contest
the validity of such a charge. In both cases, the answer is grounded in symbolism. Rightly or
wrongly, the denunciatory effect of a conviction for culpable homicide would inevitably have
been greater than that of a conviction for a violation of the 1974 Act. Additionally, it is often
assumed that such symbolism would have practical consequences in the form of a higher penalty
being imposed on the offending corporation. Such a consequence is possible, but not inevitable
– in the five successful prosecutions to date for corporate manslaughter under English law, the
average fine appears to have been £15,000.4 Conversely, the fact that a prosecution is brought
under the 1974 Act rather than at common law does not necessarily mean that any fine imposed
will be low: the Southall rail crash (in which seven people died) resulted in a fine of £1.5 million
being levied on Great Western Trains.5
1 The decision was unanimous. Opinions were delivered by Lord Hamilton and Lord Osborne, while Lord
MacLean concurred with Lord Hamilton.
2 Transco plc v HM Advocate 2004 SLT 41 (henceforth Transco).
3 The (lengthy) indictment is not included in full in the SLT report of the case. At the time of writing, it was
available from the Crown Office website (<http://www.crownoffice.gov.uk/news_items/Transco%
20release%20and%20indictment.doc>).
4 Centre for Corporate Accountability, Manslaughter Cases – Convictions of Companies, Directors etc
(<http://www.corporateaccountability.org/manslaughter/cases/convictions.htmi>).
5 At the time of writing, Thames Trains was awaiting sentence for offences under the 1974 Act relating to
the Paddington rail disaster in October 1999 in which thirty-one passengers were killed. See “Padding-
ton train crash company faces huge fine”, Daily Telegraph, 11 Dec 2003.
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B. MENS REA AND ADVERTENCE
The form of culpable homicide on which the Crown case in Transco was based was what is some-
times, perhaps misleadingly, referred to as “lawful act” culpable homicide. As Lord Hamilton
observes, this terminology serves only to distinguish this form of culpable homicide from
“unlawful act” culpable homicide: “it is plain that culpable homicide of [this] kind can be com-
mitted not only where some lawful duty is performed in a culpable way but also where in any
circumstances a person acts or fails to act with the requisite degree of culpability and death
results.”6
The first question, therefore, for the Transco court was general and not directly concerned
with the issue of corporate culpability: what is the “requisite degree of culpability” required for
this form of culpable homicide? This is not a point on which the court reaches a concluded view,
but Lords Hamilton and Osborne are clear on one crucial point: a “state of mind” is required.7 As
Lord Hamilton explains:
…under the law of Scotland the mental element (mens rea) is and remains a necessary and
significant element in the crime of (“lawful act”) culpable homicide. That element may, of
course, be proved in various ways, including proof by inference from external facts. But it is,
in my view, erroneous to suppose that the actual state of mind of a person accused of culpable
homicide of this kind can be ignored and guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of
proof that the conduct in question fell below an objectively set standard.8
Although the point is not entirely clear, this approach appears to assume that mens rea must
entail at least awareness of risk.9 Lord Hamilton goes on to justify this position by reference to
the “general requirement of the law of Scotland … that a common law crime can be committed
only where the requisite mental element exists,”10 noting Hume’s reference to the requirement
of “dole”, or a “corrupt and evil intention”,11 and Macdonald’s reference to “wicked intent”.12
It seems doubtful, however, that either Hume or Macdonald intended these phrases to have
the meaning which might be read into them by a modern criminal lawyer. Macdonald, while
insisting on “wicked intent” for criminal liability, held that such wicked intent may be excluded
by a mistake which “is based on reasonable grounds and would, if true, have justified the act
done.”13 Similarly, Hume took the view that a person who appropriated property in the mistaken
belief that it was his own would be guilty of theft unless the belief was “excusable”14 – that is, it
seems, that there were reasonable grounds for the belief. But to hold a person guilty of theft on
the basis that he does not have reasonable grounds for his belief that he is the owner of the
6 Transco, per Lord Hamilton at 54.
7 Lord Osborne specifically describes this as a “criminal intent”: Transco, per Lord Osborne at 45.
8 Transco, per Lord Hamilton at 54.
9 It has sometimes been argued that negligence, being inadvertent, cannot amount to mens rea because it
does not involve awareness of risk and is therefore not a state of mind. But that is to attach too much
weight to a “question of nomenclature” and does not address the real question of whether negligence is
an appropriate basis for criminal responsibility. See H L A Hart, “Negligence, mens rea and criminal
responsibility”, in Punishment and Responsibility (1968), 136.
10 Transco, per Lord Hamilton at 55.
11 D Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, Respecting Crimes, 4th edn by B R Bell (1844), vol 1, 21.
12 J H A Macdonald, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland, 5th edn by J Walker and D J
Stevenson (1948), 1.
13 Macdonald, 11. It should be noted that the references by Lord Hamilton and this note to Macdonald’s
text are references to interpolations in Walker and Stevenson’s fifth and final edition. Previous editions
asserted that wicked intent would be presumed, and did not address the issue of mistaken belief in this way.
14 See Hume, 1, 73-75.
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property is, in fact, to hold him liable for his conduct “falling below an objectively set standard”
– exactly the kind of liability which Lord Hamilton rejects.
This approach, reliant as it is on general principles of criminal culpability, has potential
consequences which range far beyond the issue of corporate culpable homicide. Most obviously,
if mens rea requires awareness of risk, then that would seem to bolster the rule in Jamieson v HM
Advocate that a man who has sexual intercourse with a woman in the unreasonably mistaken belief
that she is consenting cannot be guilty of rape (or any other offence), despite the recent hint by
the High Court that this rule might be open for reconsideration.15 Lord Hamilton’s approach is
consistent with the general trend in Scots criminal law towards subjectivism16 – a trend which
may be defensible, but which probably cannot be justified on the basis of reference to writers
such as Hume and Macdonald, who employed a rather different concept of criminal culpability.
C. ATTRIBUTING MENS REA TO THE COMPANY
Having considered the question of what form of mens rea is required for culpable homicide,
both Lords Hamilton and Osborne went on to conclude that such mens rea may only be brought
home to a corporate body by means of the identification principle outlined in Tesco Ltd v
Nattrass.17 In accordance with that principle, it must be demonstrated that an individual (or
perhaps a group of individuals acting collectively), who could be identified as the “directing
mind and will” of the corporation, possessed the requisite mens rea.18 It seems likely that this
principle applies to all common law crimes under Scots law,19 but the position of statutory crimes
is likely to be a more complex matter dependent on the particular statute concerned.20
The identification principle was, indeed, accepted by Crown counsel during the hearing of
the appeal. The advocate depute, however, sought to argue that provided it could be shown that
a series of individuals (or committees) who could be described as the “directing mind and will”
of the corporation had certain knowledge, the company could be regarded as having the sum
total of that knowledge, and therefore as possessing the mens rea of culpable homicide, despite
the fact that no individual or individuals themselves possessed such mens rea. That approach
was, however, rejected by the court, with Lord Hamilton describing it as “an aggregation of
separate states of mind” and therefore “contrary to the basic tenets of Scots criminal law”.21
Even if aggregation in the form proposed by the Crown had been permissible, it is difficult to
see how it could possibly have led to a successful prosecution. The point may be explained by
way of an example, as follows. We may assume that a natural person (A), if aware of facts B and
C, can be expected to conclude on the basis of that knowledge that risk D exists. Let us assume
also that risk D is of a sufficient degree that awareness of that risk will amount to sufficient mens
rea for culpable homicide (in the sense that mens rea is understood by the Transco court). If A
were to be prosecuted for a culpable homicide, evidence that he was aware of facts B and C will
be relevant to prove that he was aware of risk D. That is uncontroversial, but what may be
overlooked is that A’s culpability is based on his awareness of that risk and not his knowledge of
the underlying facts (even if such knowledge is a necessary precursor for awareness of the
relevant risk). If it can be shown merely that A was aware of facts B and C, but not of risk D
15 See Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 1 of 2001) 2002 SLT 466, per Lord Justice General Cullen at 476.
16 Cf the potential consequences of the decision in Drury v HM Advocate 2001 SLT 1013, on which see F
Leverick, “Mistake in self-defence after Drury” 2002 JR 35.
17 [1972] AC 153.
18 See Transco, per Lord Hamilton at 57 and Lord Osborne at 51.
19 See Transco, per Lord Hamilton at 57.
20 See Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500; J Ross,
“Corporate criminal liability: one form or many forms?” 1999 JR 49.
21 Transco, per Lord Hamilton at 60.
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(perhaps because A was mentally subnormal and therefore unlikely to appreciate the con-
sequent risk),22 this will not be sufficient for criminal liability. In a similar vein, showing that a
corporation was aware of facts B and C cannot, logically, suffice to show that the corporation was
“aware” (in the sense required by the identification principle) of risk D. Such proof may be
sufficient to show that the corporation should have known of risk D, but the approach taken by
the Transco court to mens rea means that “should have known” will not suffice for liability.
D. IS CORPORATE CULPABLE HOMICIDE A REALISTIC POSSIBILITY?
The decision in Transco does not, of course, rule out the possibility of a corporation being found
guilty of culpable homicide under Scots law. However, the English experience with the
identification doctrine suggests that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to bring a successful
prosecution against a large and complex corporation. Prosecutions may be possible where the
corporation is a small one and a single individual can more readily be identified as the “directing
mind and will” of the corporation, but in such cases it is doubtful whether much is gained by
proceeding against the corporation rather than against that individual directly.23
One question remains. The indictment served on Transco was quite clearly based on an
allegation of lawful act culpable homicide. However, there is arguably an alternative route to
succeeding in a prosecution for corporate culpable homicide, which is this. If Transco was guilty
of conduct amounting to an offence under the 1974 Act, and this conduct caused four deaths,
then is this not arguably unlawful act culpable homicide? The scope of unlawful act culpable
homicide in Scots law is less than clear, but it seems that the High Court has been prepared to
accept that a theft which causes a death may be unlawful act culpable homicide (without,
therefore, the need to prove the mens rea required for lawful act culpable homicide).24 It is
difficult, therefore, to see why a breach of sections 3 and 33(1) of the 1974 Act, which carry with
them a much greater risk of personal injury or death than does theft, should not also provide a
foundation for the offence. It may be, of course, that a charge of unlawful act culpable homicide
cannot be based on conduct which is an offence under statute rather than common law,25 but this
is a question which has yet to be determined by the courts.26
E. WHERE NOW?
It remains possible that the Scottish Parliament may legislate on the issue of corporate criminal
liability, perhaps by way of a member’s Bill. On the 3 June 2003, Karen Gillon MSP lodged a
proposal for such legislation: a “Culpable Homicide by Corporate Bodies Bill”, “to provide for a
charge of culpable homicide to be brought against corporate bodies”. The proposal was
supported by twenty-one MSPs.27
22 See, e.g., R v Stephenson [1979] QB 695.
23 Save, perhaps, in the unlikely case where the prosecution can prove that an individual who was
necessarily a “directing mind and will” of the corporation acted with the requisite mens rea, but cannot
establish the identity of that individual. Cf Purcell Meats (Scotland) Ltd v McLeod 1987 SLT 528.
24 Lourie v HM Advocate 1988 SCCR 634.
25 If unlawful act culpable homicide could be based on a statutory offence, it might entail the consequence
that causing death by dangerous driving was necessarily culpable homicide. However, it could be argued
that this is an exception caused by the particular structure of criminal liability which Parliament has
opted for under the Road Traffic Acts.
26 It is also arguable that a violation of ss 3 and 33(1) of the 1974 Act represents an omission rather than an
act – but again, it has never been decided that a charge of unlawful act culpable homicide cannot be
based on a criminal omission.
27 Scottish Parliament, Business Bulletin No 99/2003, section G.
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Even assuming that the principle underlying such a proposal is accepted, however, there is
considerable room for debate over the detail. There is, first, no accepted “model” of corporate
liability which can be readily adopted. South of the border, the 1996 proposals of the Law
Commission for a new offence of corporate killing28 were substantially narrower than the
proposals subsequently brought forward by the Home Office in its 2000 consultation paper.29
Both sets of proposals have been heavily criticised for a variety of reasons.30 While the UK
Government is expected to introduce legislation later this year,31 it seems possible that the draft
Bill may differ substantially from both sets of proposals.
Why, it may be asked, is the issue so difficult? There are a number of reasons. Even if it is
accepted that reform is needed, any proposal for an offence of “corporate killing” makes two
very large and questionable assumptions – first, that the new offence should be restricted to
corporations;32 and secondly, that the offence should be restricted to cases where a corporate
failure has caused death, and should not extend to cases where “only” serious injury has been
caused.
Both of these issues need proper consideration as part of any reform proposal. Even if they
are resolved, significant difficulties remain, both with respect to questions of causation and as to
how the relevant “management failure” (the Law Commission’s terminology) or similar is to be
assessed.33 There is, in the circumstances, much to be said for Glazebrook’s argument that the
proper approach is not to create an offence of “corporate killing”, but instead to create offences
of causing death or serious injury by breach of a safety regulation (similar, perhaps, to offences
such as “causing death by dangerous driving”).34 Such an approach would provide a welcome
corrective to the fact that safety offences are generally drafted in the “inchoate mode” (that is,
without reference to any harm caused), meaning that prosecutions for such offences may fail
properly to reflect the fact that death or serious injury has resulted from the corporate failure.35
In summary, while the decision in Transco represents a welcome clarification of the law, it is
unlikely to be thought to leave it in a wholly satisfactory form. The scope of corporate liability for
crimes other than culpable homicide (or, at least, statutory offences) remains unclear. There is
no accepted model for reform, and so it would be inappropriate to proceed directly to
legislation. The best approach, it is submitted, would be for the matter to be considered by the
Scottish Law Commission, with a view to legislative reform in due course.
James Chalmers
School of Law
University of Aberdeen
(The author is indebted to Michael Christie, Christopher Gane and Fiona Leverick for discussions
on the topic. The usual caveats apply.)
28 Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter (Law Com No 237, 1996).
29 Home Office, Reforming the Law on Involuntary Manslaughter: the Government’s Proposals (2000).
30 See, in particular, B Sullivan, “Corporate killing – some government proposals” [2001] Crim LR 319; P R
Glazebrook, “A better way of convicting businesses of avoidable deaths and injuries?” (2002) 61 CLJ 405.
31 See “Blunkett bill to take aim at firms that cause fatal accidents”, The Independent, 10 Nov 2003.
32 The Law Commission’s proposals would have applied only to corporations, while the Home Office
proposals would have applied to any “undertaking”. Arguably, the first is improperly narrow and the
second improperly wide. See Sullivan, note 30 above, 34-36.
33 For a particularly caustic evaluation of the Law Commission’s proposals in this respect, see Glazebrook,
note 30 above, 409-414.
34 Glazebrook, note 30 above.
35 See C Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility, 2nd edn (2001), 5-8.
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